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presumption of truth in a judge's § 2245 sentencing certification, but
also outlines the grounds upon which the presumption may be rebutted. Neither statute dictates that subjective conclusions regarding the
judge's opinion about the relative weight of evidence during sentencing hearing certifications are above review in the event of constitutional challenge. The statutes apply to findings of historical fact.
The court also said in dicta that a violation of Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68 (1985)(holding due process requires defendant have
access to a psychiatric expert where sanity is at issue) was harmless
error under Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1947). Bassette, 915
F.2d at 939. Bassette contended he needed the expert to refute
psychiatric evidence based on that expert's comments contained in a
presentence report. Williams held that due process of the fourteenth
amendment does not require a defendant have the opportunity to
confront and cross examine witnesses who testify about his prior
criminal activity during the sentencing phase of a capital case.
Although not overruled, Williams does not accurately state the current law in capital cases, and the more recent case wherein the court
mentions that Williams is cited with approval (U.S. v. Grayson, 438
U.S. 41 (1978)) was not a capital case. Gardnerv. Florida,430 U.S.
349 (1977), on the other hand, holds that the eighth and fourteenth
amendments require the right to reliable procedures at sentencing
phases of capital trials. This entails the right of the defendant to know

and to have an opportunity to rebut evidence in aggravation of the
crime. Id. at 361-62. Clearly, modem legal principles demand that
a capital defendant has the right to be aware of and rebut evidence
considered as basis for a death sentence.
The court qualified its analysis of Bassette'sAke issue by holding
thatAke was in any event unavailable to him because of the"new rule"
doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague holds that if
a requirement not affecting elements of fundamental justice is placed
on states by the United States Supreme Court after the final disposition of a defendant's state court case on direct appeal, it is a "new rule"
for that defendant and its implications are not open for use in his case.
Bassette's direct appeal became final before Ake was decided. This is
perhaps useful as an example of how important it is to raise all issues
possible at the state court trial and appellate levels. See Hobart, State
Habeas in Virginia, A Critical Transition, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 3, No. I, p. 2 3 (1990). Notwithstanding the protection offered by
the Harrisrule, if the record does not speak for itself when the case
enters the federal system, many vital issues may be waived permanently. See Powley, Perfecting the Record of a Capital Case in
Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 26 (1990).
Summary and analysis by:
Peter T. Hansen

CLOZZA v. MURRAY
913 F.2d 1092 (1990)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On January 14, 1983, the Virginia Beach Police arrested Albert
J. Clozza for sexual offenses and the murder of thirteen year old Patty
Bolton. While initially denying that he committed the crimes, Clozza
eventually confessed to all of the crimes except rape, an essential
element of the capital murder charge. Later, in an interview he
initiated, Clozza admitted to raping the victim. Clozza also stated that
he had consumed approximately sixteen beers during the day of the
offense. In response to police interrogation, Clozza suggested that
cruelty may have been his motivation for the physical and sexual
assaults. Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d 1092, 1096 (1990).
The jury convicted Clozza of capital murder, aggravated sexual
battery, sexual penetration with an inanimate object, abduction with
intent to defile, and two counts of forcible sodomy. Based upon a
finding of both statutory aggravating factors, the jury sentenced
Clozza to death for capital murder committed during or after rape. Id.
After exhausting his direct appeals and state habeas claims,
Clozza filed petition for federal habeas relief. Id. at 1096. The District
Court denied relief. Id. at 1092. He appealed to the Fourth Circuit,
assigning two grounds of error. First, Clozza claimed that he had been
denied effective assistance of counsel during the trial and sentencing
phases of the capital murder trial. Id. at 1097. Second, he claimed that
the Virginia capital sentencing procedure was unconstitutional under
the fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution. Id.
I.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A. Trial Phase
Clozza's first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel revolved
around twb concerns: Clozza claimed that his attorney's statements
prejudiced his case and conceded his guilt, and that his attorney failed
to adequately prepare him for cross examination.

During voir dire, but while outside the presence of any jurors,
Clozza's attorney stated that he did not want to participate in the trial
and did so only because it was his duty and his job. Id. at 1098. He
also stated that "some of the ACLU lawyers" would have to decide if
he had gone to far with his instincts in defending Clozza. Id. In his
opening statements he stated it was difficult getting to like Clozza
enough to defend him adequately. Id. Further, he stated, "[i]f it is my
kid, a lawyer training in law school, it wouldn't make any difference,
I would probably want to kill him." Id. During his direct examination
of Clozza, the attorney asked if he knew that it would take a miracle
such as would have saved the victim to save him. Id. In addition to
these statements, the attorney also made the remark during the trial
that it was "really weird" celebrating Halloween while representing
Clozza. Id. During closing arguments, the attorney said that he did
not want to put his client back on the street, and that ifClozza's suicide
attempt had been successful, it would not have been the greatest
tragedy. Id.
Clozza argued that these statements not only prejudiced his case
but also conceded his guilt, thereby establishing a foundation to
overturn his capital murder conviction due to ineffective assistance of
counsel. His attorney, however, defended the remarks as an integral
part of his trial strategy to build credibility with the jurors.
Additionally, Clozza argued that his attorney was ineffective
because he failed to prepare Clozza for cross examination, allegedly
causing the contradictory intoxication defense. Contrary to his
confession statements, Clozza testified during cross examination that
he was sober while abducting Patty Bolton. On the account of this
testimony, Clozza's attorney had to persuade the jury to believe
Clozza's out of court confession statement regarding his intoxication,
while convincing them to disregard his in court statement that he was
sober. Further, the attorney also had to convince the jury that Clozza's
in court statement, that he didn't know if he raped the victim, was true
and that Clozza's out of court statement that he had raped her should
be disregarded.
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B. Sentencing Phase
Clozza argued that his attorney failed to provide effective assistance of counsel by not adequately preparing for the sentencing
stage of the bifurcated trial. Id. at 1101. He also made specific claims
including, that his attorney failed to recall a physician who had
testified about intoxication during the guilt phase, failed to call
Clozza's parents to testify, and failed to submit jury instructions. Id.
at 1102, 1103.
II.

Virginia Capital Sentencing Procedures

Clozza advanced several theories to support his claim that the
Virginia capital sentencing procedure is unconstitutional. First, he
claimed that the procedure is unconstitutional on its face and as
applied under the fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 1104.
Second, Clozza made specific challenges to procedures employed in
the Virginia death penalty statute, including: the vileness factor, the
verdict form, the jury instructions, and the Virginia Supreme Court
proportionality review. Id.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of relief.
Id. at 1092. It reviewed Clozza's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim using the two part test announced in Stricklandv. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing the governing standard for review
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims). Clozza, 913 F.2d at 1097.
The Stricklandtest not only evaluates the attorney's performance but
also determines whether his actions had a reasonable probability of
affecting the outcome of the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see
also, Marlowe, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol 3, No. 1, p. 29 (1990).
The Fourth Circuit determined that the attorney's performance
and trial conduct was a reasonable tactical strategy to build credibility
with the jury considering the contradictory defense theories available.
Clozza,913F.2dat 1100. Thecourtfurtherheldthateven if Clozza's
attorney had failed to provide reasonable assistance, there was no
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different. Id. at 1101. Thus, the Court found that Clozza
had not satisfied either prong of the Stricklandtest; and therefore, he
had not been denied ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
In response to the constitutional challenges to the Virginia
sentencing procedure, the Fourth Circuit rejected Clozza's general
and specific claims. Because Clozza failed to raise his constitutional
challenges during the earlier appeals and because he failed to establish
a sufficiently recognized legal excuse, the Fourth Circuit held that
Clozza was barred from raising his constitutional challenges to the
Virginia capital sentencing procedure. Id. at 1104. Noting the gravity
of the case, the Fourth Circuit addressed Clozza's specific constitutional challenges but dismissed them in summary fashion.
APPLICATION/ANALYSIS IN VIRGINIA
I.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

The Fourth Circuit noted that all claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel begin with the two part Stricklandtest. Id. at 1097. It stated
that under Strickland, a court evaluates counsel's performance by the
"objective standard of 'reasonably effective assistance' under prevailing professional norms." Id. In order to protect against the inherent difficulties of assessing counsel's conduct, this prong of the
analysis includes a procedural presumption that the counsel's conduct
falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. If the
counsel's performance is found to fall below the professional norms
of reasonable assistance, the court continues to the second prong of the

test. The second prong of the Stricklandtest requires "[t]he defendant
to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. at 1097, 1098. This second prong essentially asks
whether there is a reasonable probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the case. Id. at 1098; but see, Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)(noting that a court is not
required to address both prongs of the test if the defendant fails to
prove either prong: "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course
should be followed.").
A. The Trial Phase
Clozza claimed that his attorney made remarks which prejudiced
his case and conceded guilt, and that his attorney failed to adequately
prepare him for cross examination. Clozza, 913 F.2d at 1098.
Foremost, the Fourth Circuit noted that such determinations
must be viewed with an eye toward the particular facts of a case and
the strategy employed by counsel. Id. According to the court, Clozza's
attorney was faced with only two real defenses to the capital murder
charge: the intoxication defense of diminished capacity and the
insufficiency of evidence to establish rape beyond a reasonable doubt.
These two defenses were complicated by the contradicting evidence.
TheFourth Circuitthen addressed Clozza's claim thathis attorney
failed to provide effective assistance of counsel by conceding his
guilt. While stating that unwarranted concessions of guilt have been
sufficient to establish ineffective assistance claims, it found Clozza's
claim distinguishable because he had confessed to the crimes. Id. at
1099 (noting that in previous successful ineffective assistance of
counsel challenges, the attorney conceded guilt when the defendant
had pleaded not guilty and denied committing the crimes). The court
also highlighted the distinction between statements which are tactical
retreats and statements which are a complete surrender. Id. It stated
that since Clozza had already confessed to the offenses, nothing short
of complete concession of the defendant's guilt would violate
Strickland. Id. The court attributed the attorney's statements to trial
strategy and could not, in keeping with Strickland, second guess
counsel's tactical decisions. Id.
The Fourth Circuit also found that the attorney's failure to
prepare Clozza for cross examination was not so egregious as to
establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 1101.
Although Clozza's attorney stated that he did not normally prepare his
clients for cross examination because a witness who is not lying will
not be tripped up, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless observed that Clozza
had maintained for nine months that he was intoxicated during his
abduction of Bolton. Even though this failure to prepare Clozza for
cross examination was not found to violate the Stricklandstandard,
nothing in the court's opinion should be construed as endorsing the
practice of not preparing clients for cross examination. Many factors
other than untruthfulness can detrimentally affect a witness who has
not been prepared for cross examination.
In this particular case, the Fourth Circuit stated that reviewing the
state habeas court's finding of reasonable professional assistance
involved mixed questions of law and fact; and for this reason, the first
prong of the Stricklandtest was not subject to the ordinary procedural
presumption in favor of state findings of fact as required under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). Id. However, even without the procedural presumption, the Fourth found that the attorney argued the contradictory
defenses to best of his ability, and that looking at the picture as a
whole, the attorney's performance was not ineffective. Id.
The Fourth Circuit further agreed with the state habeas court's
findings that even if Clozza's attorney had failed to provide reasonable assistance that the attorney's actions did not have a reasonable
probability of affecting the outcome of the case. Id. at I 101. Because
Clozza's voluntarily confessed to all of the crimes except capital
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murder and because of his testimony about intoxication and rape
contradicted his confession statements, the Fourth Circuit could not
conclude that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different. Id.

the sentencing stage with additional evidence and appropriate witness
testimony.

B. The Sentencing Phase
Using the Stricklandtest, the Fourth Circuit also rejected Clozza's
claims that his attorney failed to provide effective assistance of
counsel during the sentencing phase of the trial. Id. at 1102. These
challenges alleged that Clozza's attorney generally failed to prepare
for the sentencing phase, and specifically failed to recall the physician
and Clozza's parents to testify and to submit jury instructions.
Regarding the general claim, the Fourth Circuit found that
counsel had adequately prepared for the second phase of the bifurcated
trial. Id. Even though this was the attorney's first capital case, the
court pointed out that he was an experienced criminal defense attorney, that he had researched the Commonwealth's theories for prosecution, had studied the statutes and procedures, and had Clozza
examined by a psychiatrist to discovery possible defenses theories.
Id.
Regarding the specific claims, the court found that the attorney's
explanations justified his decision not to call the physician or Clozza's
parents to testify during the sentencing stage. Id. at 1102, 1103. In
response to Clozza's claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing
to submit jury instructions, the court noted that there is no constitutional duty that a state model instructions employ specific standards
for instructingjuries in the consideration of aggravating and mitigating
factors. Id. at 1103. Because the Virginia model jury instructions
informed the jury that they were entitled to consider all of the evidence
presented, the court found "that the attorney was not ineffective for
failing to offer further instructions with reference to mitigation of the
sentence." Id.
The Virginia Supreme Court has also held that the Virginia jury
instructions failure to instruct the jury about the statutory mitigating
factors is not unconstitutional. Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201,
212, 257 S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979). Because of this holding, it is
important that jury instructions are submitted which highlight matters
not contained in the Virginia model instructions. These instructions
should include the definition of mitigation and the jury's right to vote
for a sentence of life even if both aggravating factors have been found.
It is also a useful strategy to reinforce these considerations during
closing arguments of the penalty trial.
In rejecting Clozza's ineffective assistance of counsel claim at
the sentencing phase, the court also pointed out that all mitigation
evidence available had been presented during the guilt phase. However, because so much more evidence is relevant at the penalty phase
of a capital murder trial, it is difficult to imagine that all possible
mitigation evidence had been presented during the guilt phase of the
trial. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)(any aspect of the
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death is relevant mitigation evidence that the jury is entitled to
consider when determining the appropriate sentence). Even though
some of the mitigating evidence may have been presented during the
guilt phase, a theory of mitigation should always be supported during

Clozza's last claim questioned the constitutionality of Virginia's
capital sentencing procedure. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the state
habeas court's finding that the claim was procedurally barred because
it had not been brought up at trial or on direct appeal. Id. at 1104.
Procedural defaults have been excused if there was (1) an objective
factor external to the defense which impeded the defendant's attorney
from complying with the state procedural rules; (2) a novel claim
which has not been addressed by the courts; or (3) ineffective assistance of counsel caused the default. Id.
The court did not find any external factor or novel claim excusing
the procedural default. When considering the third possible excuse,
the court noted that allegations of general ineffective assistance of
counsel will not always provide a basis to overturn specific claims of
ineffective assistance. Id. Here, it pointed out that even if the attorney
had been ineffective in a earlier phase of the trial, which the court did
not find, it would not necessarily mean that the attorney was ineffective
because of a failure to raise a claim on appeal. Id. Essentially, general
allegations do not necessarily cover specific claims.
It should be noted that when an attorney fails to raise claims at
trial or on appeal, the resulting procedural bar does not necessarily
establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)(denial of federal review of substantive
and ineffective assistance of counsel claims procedurally barred on
state grounds, unless the petitioner shows both "cause" excusing the
default, and "prejudice" from lack of federal review); see also,
Strickland (setting forth the standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
Even though finding that Clozza's constitutional challenges
were procedurally barred, the Fourth Circuit did address the merits of
some of the claims. Particularly, Clozza's claims challenging the
vileness factor as vague, the verdict form as depriving him of a
unanimous verdict on either of the aggravating factors, the court's
failure to instruct the jury on statutory mitigating factors, and the
Virginia Supreme Court proportionality review. Id. After highlighting the merits of these claims, the Fourth Circuit dismissed each
of these in a summary fashion.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim displays the judicial deference and responsibility granted
to capital defense attorneys. Even if the judicial standards do not
require greater preparation, ethical responsibilities would certainly
require diligence and professional representation on behalf of one
who stands to lose his life. As evident through the rejection of the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the constitutional challenges, this case, like many before, places a greater emphasis on the
events at the trial level with limited opportunities to correct errors on
appeal.

II. Virginia Capital Sentencing Procedure

Summary and analysis by:
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